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Divestiture of illegally Held Assets: Observations 
on its Scope, Objective, and Limitations 
"Divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust 
remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure."1 This 
observation was made with reference to an order requiring divestiture 
of illegally held stock. In the context of the divestiture of illegally 
held assets, however, the statement is an oversimplification of myriad 
complex problems. This Comment will examine the difficulties en-
countered in eliminating the anticompetitive effects of a fully con• 
summated merger found to have violated section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.2 No attempt will be made to assess the substantive doctrine upon 
which the violation in any instance was based, except insofar as it is 
necessary to correlate that doctrine with the problems involved in 
providing appropriate relief. Although the problems surrounding 
asset divestiture are difficult to discuss in the abstract, certain con-
clusions regarding the permissible scope, objectives, and practical 
limitations of the divestiture remedy should be drawn to provide a 
much-needed conceptual framework for each individual case. 
I. THE REMEDIAL AGENCIES 
The primary responsibility for the enforcement of section 7 has 
been reposed by Congress in both the Federal Trade Commission 
and the Antitrust Division of the Department 9f Justice.8 The 
source of the FTC's power to issue orders enforcing the merger 
provision is section 11 of the Clayton Act,4 which is the only specific 
1. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961) (here• 
inafter cited as du Pont-General Motors II). The problem in this case had been con· 
sidered by the Court before in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 353 
U.S. 586 (1957) (hereinafter cited as du Pont-General Motors I), 
2. Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 
731 (1914). Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part: 
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the 
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital •.. of another corporation 
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly. 
See generally Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM, L, 
R.Ev. 766 (1952). 
3. The functions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice, although originally quite different, are now very similar, 
Until the enactment of the Antitrust Civil Process Act §§ 1-6, 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1964) and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1964), however, the Commission's ability 
to investigate possible violations of § 7 far exceeded that of the Department of Justice, 
See Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 CoLUM. L. REV, 500, 
506-07 nn.33-36 (1964). 
In addition to the Commission and the Antitrust Division there are about twenty 
other federal agencies with some degree of responsibility for the enforcement of tl1e 
antitrust laws. See MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY; LEGAL AND ECONOMIC Issu.ES 
320 (1962); Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 581 (1964). 
4. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). 
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statutory reference to divestiture. It provides that the Commission 
shall issue an order requiring the respondent "to cease and desist 
from such violations, and divest itself of the stock, or other such 
capital, or assets, held ... contrary to the provisions of sections 7 and 
8 ... in the manner and within the time fixed by said order." The 
Department of Justice, on the other hand, institutes proceedings 
under section 15 of the Clayton Act,5 which invests district courts 
with "jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of" section 7 
and directs United States attorneys "to institute proceedings in equity 
to pre.vent and restrain such violations." 
A. Remedial Powers of the Federal Courts 
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in du Pont-
General Motors 116 established that district courts have reason-
ably broad power to formulate a remedy in a proceeding initiated by 
the Justice Department.7 This interpretation of section 15 has en-
abled district courts to weigh the feasibility of measures in lieu of 
or ancillary to divestiture, such as a ban on future acquisitions in the 
relevant line of commerce.8 Thus, the Justice Department can pro-
ceed against a merger with the knowledge that it may demand, and 
the court-may order, any reasonably necessary remedial measures 
if a violation is found.9 
B. Remedial Powers of the FTC 
The difference in statutory language between section 15 and 
section 11 has caused uncertainty with respect to the scope of the re-
medial powers of the Federal Trade Commission under the latter 
section. It is not clear from the language of section 11 whether the 
Commission possesses powers as broad as those which can be exercised 
5. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). 
6. 366 U.S. 316 (1961). 
7. In response to a Government contention that upon finding a violation of § 7 
the court was required to order complete divestiture, the Court stated that "Congress 
would not be deemed to have restricted the broad remedial powers of courts of equity 
without explicit language doing so in terms, or some other strong indication of intent." 
Id. at 328 n.9. 
8. On remand to the district court following du Pont-General Motors II, that court 
included in its decree several ancillary relief provisions that it found to be "necessary 
and appropriate" or "reasonably related" to the § 7 violation, including a ten-year 
prohibition on the ownership of stock instead of a perpetual ban, which had been 
held to be unnecessary and inappropriate. United States .v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
&: Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 1[ 75942 (N.D. III.). 
9. Former Assistant Attorney General William H. Orrick, Jr., has stated that, "we 
believe that . . • when we challenge an already consummated merger . . . any 
divestiture order subsequently issued may and should require divestiture of sufficient 
cash to insure adequate working capital_ for the divested company plus such cash or 
assets as may be required to finance any needed capital improvements, or other mod-
ernization of the plants to be divested." N.Y. STATE BAR AssOCIATION, 1965 ANTITRUST 
LAW SYMl'OSIUM (TRADE REG. REP. ED.) 37-38. 
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by the courts in actions instituted by the Justice Department.10 A 
series of decisions prior to 1950 established that the Commission's 
remedial powers under section 11 did not coincide with those of a 
court of equity.11 In one case, the Supreme Court held that the 
Commission could not order divestiture of assets, even though the 
assets had been acquired as the result of an unlawful stock acquisi-
tion and for the express purpose of preventing the Commission from 
issuing an effective order divesting such stock.12 This narrow con-
struction was based on the view that the Commission's powers under 
section 11 were circumscribed by the literal terms of that section, 
which at that time specified stock divestiture but were silent with 
respect to asset divestiture.18 Further contributing to a literal inter-
pretation of the scope of the Commission's remedial power was a 
holding that section 5(b) of the Clayton Act,14 which authorizes 
orders requiring respondents "to cease and desist using" methods 
of competition found unlawful under the act, did not authorize 
divestiture as a remedy.15 
The uncertainty surrounding the extent of the Commission's 
remedial powers was manifested in factual situations which chal-
lenged the ability of the FTC to adapt its remedy to the substantive 
violation. A relatively frequent question involved the Commission's 
power to order divestiture of assets representing additions, replace-
ments, or improvements added to the assets acquired at the time of 
10. In du Pont-General Motors II, 366 U.S. at 328 n.9, the Court expressly declined 
to consider whether Congress had given the Federal Trade Commission powers under 
§ 11 as broad as those reposed in the district courts by § 15. 
11. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); Thatcher Mfg. 
Co. v. FTC, and Swift & Co, v. FTC, decided with FTC v. Western Meat Co,, 272 
U.S. 554 (1926); FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927). 
12. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, supra note 11. In Swift & Co, v. 
FTC, supra note 11, at 561, the Court said that § 7 of the Clayton Act "has no appli• 
cation to ownership of a competitor's property and business obtained prior to any 
action by the Commission, even though this was brought about through stock unlaw• 
fully he~d." See generally MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON Acr 118 (1959). 
13. One of the primary purposes of the 1950 amendments to § 7 of the Clayton 
Act was to close the obvious loophole created by the exclusion of asset acquisitions 
from its provisions. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962), 
this purpose and others are mentioned in a broad discussion of the legislative amend• 
ments. See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REV. 226 (1960); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Adminis• 
tration of the Geller-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 CoLuM. L. REV. 629 (1961), 
14. 52 Stat. 112 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). 
15. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927). Despite its holding that § 5(b) 
of the Clayton Act did not authorize the use of divestiture, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the scope of the Commission's power is of necessity broad. FTC v. 
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). In Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (19-16), 
the Court said: "[T]he Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is 
necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been dis• 
closed. It has wide latitude and judgment and the courts will not interfere except 
where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found 
·to exist." Id. at 612-13. 
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the merger. Such assets frequently exist if any appreciable length of 
time has passed between the merger and the order to divest. The 
first case litigated after the 1950 amendments and requiring divesti-
ture of a large acquired company directly posed this problem. In 
Crown Zellerbach Corp.,16 the Commission began a pattern of un-
certainty from which it has only recently departed. Crown had added 
to the acquired company new machinery and improvements valued 
at $14,300,817. In response to Crown's argument that the order of 
divestiture should not include any of these post-acquisition assets, 
the Commission stated: · 
[C]learly the broad purpose of the statute cannot be thwarted 
merely because the respondent has commingled its own assets 
with those of the acquired firm. However, it is not believed that 
the order should necessarily require the dives~iture o! all such 
assets added to the property by the respondent if the divestment 
may be otherwise accomplished without destroying the operating 
condition and organization of the acquired mill, substantially 
as it existed at or around the time of the acquisition.17 
This equivocation continued in Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,18 where the 
Commission asserted its authority to restore an acquired firm as 
a "going concern," but concluded that no showing of the necessity of 
divesting after-acquired assets was there shown.19 In Reynolds Metals 
Co. v. FTC,20 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit gave credence to the Commission's reluctance to assert broad 
powers by intimating that the Commission lacked authority to order 
divestiture of a large plant con~tructed by Reynolds to house ma-
chinery of an acquired company which had, prior to its acquisition, 
rented similar facilities. The court was at least certain that no such 
power existed unless, at a minimum, a showing were made either 
of a relationship between continued possession of the property and 
the violation of section 7, or of the necessity of divestiture to "restore" 
the competitive status quo.21 
16. 54: F.T.C. 769 (1957), afj'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 
937 (1962). · • 
17. Id. at 807. 
18. 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960). 
19. Id. at 1412. It is arguable that the Commission intended only to indicate that 
the staff had failed to put forth any satisfactory justification for broader relief. Duke, 
Scope of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 63 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1192, 1201 n.57 
(1963). . 
20. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
21. "After-acquired properties are not relevant, except in the case where they rep-
resent reinvestment of capital realized from the sale of property included in a forbidden 
acquisition and replacement of that property • • • • If ever after-acquired property 
may be subject to a government order to sell, an even greater necessity, totally absent 
on the present record, must be shown. Inasmuch as there is a failure on this record 
to demonstrate (1) any nexus between continued possession of after-acquired property 
••• and the violation of Section 7, and (2) that restoration of the competitive status 
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A related, although less frequently litigated, challenge to the 
scope of the Commission's discretion has arisen where the acquisi-
. tion of a company was found to have violated section 7 in less than 
all of the lines of commerce in which the acquired company had 
been engaged before the acquisition. Whether the Commission could 
order divestiture of assets utilized in more than the offending line 
of commerce was raised in Brillo Mfg. Co.,22 but was left unanswered. 
Prior to its acquisition by Brillo, the Williams Company had man-
ufactured both industrial and household steel wool. The Commission 
held that the acquisition violated section 7 only in the industrial 
steel wool market. The initial order entered by the hearing examiner 
would have required Brillo to divest all the acquired assets, since 
the facilities could be used interchangeably to produce both types 
of steel wool.23 The Commission, however, modified this result con-
siderably. The final order allowed Brillo to retain all the assets 
acquired, provided that they were not used in the production of 
industrial steel wool, and provided that Brillo not compete with 
the restored Williams Company for five years in that market.24 
Reluctance to go beyond the literal wording of section 11 has 
been evident in the Commission's hesitancy to utilize remedial mea-
sures ancillary to divestiture in litigated cases.25 This is in marked 
contrast to many consent decrees containing numerous involved 
provisions dealing with ancillary matters, 26 most notably an almost 
quo compels divestiture of such property, that part of the Commission's order requir• 
ing divestiture of property built or acquired after the 1956 acquisition ••• cannot 
be sustained." Id. at 231. 
22. Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 11 15772 (Feb, 28, 
1962). . 
23. Ibid. 
24. Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 11 16746, at 21672 aan. 17, 1964). 
25. Compare Pillsbury Mills Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960), and A. G. Spaulding &: 
Bros., Inc., 56 F.T.C. 1125 (1960), aff'd, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962), and Crown Zeller• 
bach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957), afj'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 
U.S. 937 (1962), with Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE R.EG. REP. 11 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965), 
and Brillo Mfg. Co., supra note 24. 
26. The simplicity of litigated orders as opposed to the detailed and complicated 
provisions contained in the usual consent decree is partly due to the ITC's practice 
of ordering the r~spondent to submit a plan of compliance in litigated areas. The plan 
provides an opportunity for the respondent to fill in the details of the order, which 
is usually intentionally abbreviated so as to facilitate the administrative process by 
removing time-consuming details from the formal litigation process. For example, in 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 11 16929 Gune 4, 
1964), the Commission approved a consent order that required Georgia-Pacific to re• 
£rain from acquiring any company engaged in (1) the coarse paper or coarse paper 
converting industries and (2) the containerboard or containerboard converting indus• 
tries, for a period of ten and seven years respectively, without prior Commission ap• 
proval. The order also required the respondent to sell or make available to indepen• 
dent jobbers and converters for a period of five years, at least 100,000 tons of coarse 
paper per year, and, for a succeeding period of five years, 75,000 tons per year from 
that produced in a designated plant. These measures were adopted in lieu of dives-
titure. See also Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer .Binder, 
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automatic ban on future acquisitions in the relevant line of com-
merce without prior Commission approval.27 
Recently, however, the Commission appears to have discarded i_ts 
conservative attitude toward the scope of its authority to dispense 
relief under section 11. In accord with a broadening view of t;he 
remedial powers available to it under section 5 of the Clayton Act 
after United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,28 the Commission 
has taken the position that it has broad equitable powers under 
section 11.29 It has recognized that meaningful relief under section 
I I may require more than a prohibition of the particular acts or 
practices found to be unlawful, and more tha~ an unravelling of 
the particular unlawful transactions that have been consummated.30 
Thus, the FTC n~w regards its own powers as not restricted to an 
1963-65) ,r 17200 (Feb. 12, 1965); Simpson Timber Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer 
Binder, 1961-63) ,r 15664 (Jan. 4, 1962); Gulf Oil Corp., 56 F.T.C. 688 (1960); Inter-
national Paper Co., 53 F.T.C. 1192 (1957). In du Pont-General Motors II, 366 U.S. at 
330 n.12, the Court indicated that "the circumstances surrounding • . • negotiated 
[consent] decrees are so different that they cannot be persuasively cited in a litigation 
context." 
27. The re.:ent practice has been to adopt a provision conditioning future acquisi-
tions upon prior Federal Trade Commission approval. E.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 3 
TRADE REG. REP. 1f 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965); Martin-Marietta Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 
(Transfer Binder, 1961-63) ,r 16335 (March 15, 1963) (seven-year prohibition against 
acquisitions of cement companies in an area covering most of the United States, and 
a ten-year ban on acquisitions (without the ITC's prior approval) of concrete pipe 
companies in a more limited region). See also National Dairy Products Corp., TRADE 
REc. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) ,r 16282 (Jan. 30, 1963). Occasionally the ITC 
has coupled a requirement that the respondent make ·certain of its products available 
to the divested company with a flat prohibition on future acquisitions. E.g., Auto-
matic Canteen Co. of America, 54 F.T.C. 1831, 1842 (1958); Vendo Co., 54 F.T.C. 253, 
258-59 (1957). 
28. 374 U.S. 321, 323 (1963). The Court indicated that the 1950 amendments to 
§§ 7 and 11 were intended to overrule Arrow-Hart&: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. ITC, 291 
U.S. 587 (1934), discussed in text accompanying note 12 supra. "Congress in 1950 clearly 
intended to. remove all question concerning the ITC's remedial power over corporate 
acquisitions •••. " Id. at 348. 
29. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17292 (July 19, 1965); Ekco Products 
Co., TRADE REC. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16879, at 21905 n.10 (April 21, 1964): 
"This is not to say that the Commission is, in all respects, a 'court of equity.' One 
difference between the Commission's powers under section 11 and the powers of the 
Federal District Courts under Section 15 may be that the courts, by virtue of their 
express authority 'to prevent and restrain' violations of the Clayton Act, but not the 
Commission, can enjoin a merger in advance of the consummation.'' Regarding the 
latter contention, however, it should be noted, that the Seventh Circuit holding in 
FTC v. Dean Fo!)ds Co., 5 TRADE REc. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 1f 71655 (7th Cir. Jan. 
19, 1966) has been granted a review by the Supreme Court. 5 TRADE REc. REP. (1966 
Trade Cas.) ,r 71660 (Jan. 24, 1966). The Seventh Circuit there held that the Com-
mission's pursuit of an injunction in the court of appeals via the All-vV'rits Statute, 
62 Stat. 944 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964), did not. give the court 
authority to enjoin the consummation of a merger pending resolution of a com-
plaint challenging the merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act. If this holding is re-
versed, the Commission's powers will be more nearly equivalent to those of the 
Justice Department in this respect. See notes 34-36 infra and accompanying text. 
30. Ekco Products Co., TRADE REc. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16879, at 
21905 (April 21, 1964). 
~ 
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order divesting the precise assets acquired in an unlawful merger. 
The Commission has chosen to reject any contenti9n that a narrow 
remedial power might be inferred from the Reynolds Metals case, 
and has elected to treat that case as an exercise of discretion. Like-
wise, neither a ban on future acquisitions31 nor a decree which would 
require divestiture of assets used in more than the offending line of 
commerce32 is now considered beyond the scope of the FTC's dis-
cretion. 
The Com~ission's disposition of Fruehauf Trailer Go.83 reflects 
a broadened outlook toward the scope of relief available to it under 
section 11. Fruehauf, the largest manufacturer of truck trailers in the 
United States, was held to have violated section 7 by its acquisition 
of the Hobbs ·Manufacturing Company and a subsidiary in 1955, 
and the Strick Company and a subsidiary in 1956. The passage of 
almost ten years between the date of acquisition and the order of 
divestiture posed practical problems that brought into question the 
power of the Commission to restore the acquired concerns in some 
competitive form. No longer hindered by restrictive doubts about its 
power, the Commission declared its purpose to be that of restoring, 
as far as practicable and equitable, the state of competition in the 
relevant market as it would have been but for the acquisition.84 
Counsel on both sides agreed that this could not be accomplished by 
an order requiring Fruehauf to divest the precise assets acquired in 
1955 and 1956. Rejecting more limited proposals,85 the Commission 
stated "if the . . . order is to be effective respondent must divest 
sufficient assets, including assets acquired after the acquisition, to 
reconstruct them as going concei:ns."86 · 
In Beatrice Foods Go. 81 the Commission reaffirmed its position 
that its relief po,vers under section 7 are equivalent to those available 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
33. 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,i 17292 Guly 19, 1965). 
34. Id. at 22410. 
35. The Commission rejected a plan, proposed by Fruehauf's counsel, that would 
have required Fruehauf to divest the assets actually acquired from Strick, together 
with sufficient additional assets to restore Strick to the same relative competitive stand• 
ing it had at the time of the acquisition. While this seems broad enough to encompass 
the order actually given-to restore Strick to approximately the competitive standing 
it would have had but for the acquisition-the requested order was so vague as to be 
virtually meaningless. Id. at 22412., 
36. Fr'uehalf Trailer Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,I 17292, at 22411 Guly 19, 1965). It 
might be inferred that the FTC's broadened outlook toward its remedial powers has 
been rejected in consent decrees as well. In Mead Corp., TRADE REc. REP. (Transfer 
.Binder, 1963-65) ,I 17201 (Feb. 12, 1965) (consent decree), the FTC required the respon-
dent to divest seven corrugated box converting plants it had acquired since 1956, to 
install at its Grand Rapids, Michigan plant, a corrugator capable of converting approxi-
mately eighteen thousand tons of containerboard into corrugated products, and to 
sell the expanded plant. 
37. Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,I 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965). 
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to it under section 5.38 Thus, it did not hesitate to impose a ten-
year ban on acquisitions in the relevant line of commerce in addition 
to an order to divest.39 These cases leave little doubt that the Com-
mission now considers itself the possessor of remedial powers ade-
quate to alleviate whatever violation it confronts. · 
C. The FTC and the Preliminary Injunction 
The Commission's recent liberal attitude toward the scope of its 
powers under section 11 conflicts ·with the historical tendency of 
the courts to delimit the powers of the Commission within the pre-
cise language of the Clayton Act.40 However, the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,41 that the Commission has 
standing to resort to the courts for a preliminary injunction in a sec-
tion 7 case, is a break with that tendency and would seem to indicate 
a more favorable judicial attitude toward the Commission's powers 
to attack mergers. There are strong arguments to support the Com-
mission's position that its remedial powers under section 11 should 
be construed broadly. 
The unraveling of corporate acquisitions requires considerable 
imagination and flexibility if the ill effects of an unlawful merger 
are to be eliminated. The variety of remedial measures adopted by 
the district courts in proceedings instituted by the Justice Depart-
ment indicates that proper and reasoned exercise of remedial discre-
tion demands a wide range of alternatives within which the many 
relevant factors which influence a decision can find adequate expres-
sion. In addition, it is difficult to perceive how the Clayton Act could 
be uniformly or fairly administered if the district courts under sec-
tion 15 have broader remedial latitude than does the Federal Trade 
Commission under section 11. Consider, for example, whether assets 
added after the merger to the originally acquired assets can be within 
the scope of a divestiture decree. If this issue is decided affirmatively 
with respect to Justice Department proceedings but negatively as to 
Federal Trade Commission actions, the initial informal allocation 
of cases between the two enforcement agencies could possibly have 
greater economic effect upon a defendant than any other decision in 
the process of resolving a section 7 violation. If such were to be the 
case, then the propriety of leaving the allocation of cases to the 
unrestricted discretion of the agencies would be- questionable. Like-
wise, if the Commission's powers are to be literalJy construed, it 
38. Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 17244, at 22335 (April 26, 1965). 
39. l3eatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 17398, at 22606 (Dec. 10, 1965). 
40. See Duke, supra note 19, at 1195-1205. , 
41. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4494 (U.S. June 14, 1966). Because the Dean Foods case was de-
cided while this Comment was in page proof, a more extensive discussion of the 
ramifications of this important decision is impossible. 
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may be inconsistent to allow it to bargain for what would be ultra 
vires conditions in the consent decrees entered. Finally, the expertise 
of the Commission42 is of little use without the power to utilize it 
effectively. If an industry has expanded in the interim between the 
merger and the order to divest, restoration of the original assets is 
not likely to restore the competitive level existing prior to the merger. 
If the Commission is to be subjected to a more restrictive standard 
than that applied to the Justice Department, it may be rendered 
impotent, so that effective relief would be difficult without resort to 
the theoretically less adept courts. 
The Supreme Court has yet to confirm or deny the Commission's 
interpretation of section 11. It is not unreasonable to expect, how-
ever, that the Court will adopt a position analogous to its views in 
Philadelphia Bank43 and interpret section 11 as giving to the Com-
mission the remedial power necessary to effectuate the policies of 
the statute which the Commission has been given a mandate to 
enforce. 
I!. THE OBJEGI'IVE OF DIVESTITURE 
Reasoned exercise of discretion requires a consideration of the 
objective of divestiture as a remedial device. It is generally acknowl-
edged that divestiture is intended to remove the anticompetitive 
effects of an unlawful acquisition by restoring the competitive status 
quo, not merely to punish the offending company.44 The typical 
divestiture order is phrased in terms designed to illuminate the 
phrase, "restoring competition," as it applies in the particular case; 
details of compliance with these directives are then the subject of 
later negotiation between the parties.46 The Borden Company, for 
42. There is by no means a universal agreement that the Federal Trade Com• 
mission possesses unique expertise. Compare Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments 
About Antitrust, Agency Regulation, and Primary Jurisdiction, 33 GEo. WASH, L. ruw. 
529 (1964), with Simon, The Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. Cm. 
L. R.Ev. 297 (1952) and Kintner, Federal Trade Commission in 1960, apologia pro vita 
nostra, in N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, 1961 ANTI-TRUST LAW SYMl'OSIUM, SALES AND PRICJNG 
PoUCIES UNDER THE ANTI-TRUST LAws 21 (1961). 
43. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 323 (1963). 
44. Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LA.ws, R.El'ORT 353 (1955): 
" 'In an equity suit,' the Supreme Court has observed, 'the end to be served is not 
punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely to end specific illegal practices, 
A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to com• 
petition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints.' Applying this 
general policy over the 60 odd years of Sherman Act history, courts have in only 24 
litigated cases entered decrees requiring divorcement, divestiture, or dissolution. 
"Such 'judicial restraint' reflects the Supreme Court's view that, since 'divestiture 
is a remedy to restore competition and not to punish those who restrain trade, it is 
not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or whether 
other effective methods, less harsh, are available.' " 
45. Section 3.24 of the FTC's Rules of Practice provides: "In those cases where 
the Commission has found a violation of law but believes that it should have further 
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example, was ordered to divest assets sufficient to restore the acquired 
company "as a going concern capable of competing effectively in the 
line of commerce involved."46 Pillsbury Mills was to draft a plan 
that would recreate Ballard & Ballard as a "going concem."47 Lone 
Star Cement was ordered to divest all assets necessary to establish 
the purchasers as "effective competitors."48 Vague directives such as 
these provide little or no insight into the competitive status to 
which the divested company is to be restored. This creates problems 
which demonstrate a need for more precise requirements in such 
orders.49 
A. Definition of the Standard 
Several considerations indicate a need for divestiture orders that 
are far more specific than those heretofore utilized. First, the com-
petitive status to which the divested company is to be restored is the 
key standard by which the success of antitrust enforcement in imple-
menting substantive doctrine can be measured. It is impossible at 
present to measure the effectiveness of divestiture in eliminating 
the anticompetitive effects of illegal acquisitions. There is a lack of 
statistical data upon which to base any conclusion, a condition that 
can be corrected only as the passage of time provides a basis for study. 
Even if such data were available, however, it would be impossible, 
in light of the elusiveness of the standard-"restoring competition"-
to which the results are now typically expected to conform, to draw 
meaningful conclusions. A more precisely defined objective would 
make success in antitrust enforcement a more measurable, and there-
fore meaningful, goal. 
information or additional views of the parties as to the form and content of the 
order to be issued, the Commission, in its discretion, may withhold final action pend-
ing the receipt of such additional information or views." 16 C.F.R. § 3.24(c) (Supp. 
1965). The provisions relating to proceedings before FTC hearing examiners do not 
authorize a hearing on relief following entry of the initial decision; instead, that 
decision must include an "appropriate order." FTC Rules of Practice § 3.21, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 3.2l(b) (Supp. 1965). The procedure described in § 3.24 was followed in Beatrice 
Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,J 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965); Ekco Products Co., TRADE REG. 
REP. (Transfer .Binder, 1963-65) 1[ 16879 (April 21, 1964); .Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. 
REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16746 Gan. 17, 1964). The groundwork for the 
adoption of this rule was laid in Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960), in which 
the Commission commented upon the inadequacies of a procedure requiring the 
submission of an order which must include the details of a method of compliance 
in addition to a determination of the legal issues. 
46. The .Borden Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer .Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16869 (April 17, 
1964). . 
47. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960). 
48. Lone Star Cement Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 17183 
Gan. 19, 1965). 
49. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 357-65 (1962) (dissenting 
opinion), where Mr. Justice Harlan objected to an appeal being based upon what he 
considered to be an order so lacking in detail as to render the appellate debate 
premature. See also Consolidated Foods Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 
1961-63) ,r 16182, at 20982 (Nov. 15, 1962). 
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Second, 'identification of the divested company's desired competi-
tive potential has a crucial bearing on the quantum of assets to be 
severed. Vaguely worded directives only delay the inevitable con-
frontation with· this critical issue, prolong the task of those who 
depend upon the order as a base from which to draw a conforming 
plan of divestiture50 and remove the resolution of this important 
question from the proper forum to an informal negotiating table. 
Third, divestiture should be inextricably bound to the substan-
tive doctrine that called forth the need for relief. An inevitable side 
effect of imprecise divestiture orders is the widening of the gulf be-
tween remedy and substantive doctrine. Section 7 cases often appear 
to entail two separate adversary proceedings: the first in the courts 
to resolve substantive issues, and the second at the bargaining table 
where the . details of remedial measures are negotiated. Periodic 
breakdowns in antitrust enforcement due to remedial measures 
which appear to disregard their substantive context have been the 
subject of recurring criticism directed at the enforcement agencies,li1 
The order to divest, entered by a court or the Commission, provides 
an opportunity to recognize this relationship and to relate remedial 
policy properly to the anticompetitive state of affairs found to exist. 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,52 although the substantive 
violation partially resulted from Brown's own economic resources, 
characterized as a "deep pocket," divestiture resulted in an eventual 
purchase of the acquired company by the .equally affiuent F. W. 
Woolworth Company.53 Had the remedial order in Brown Shoe been 
50. It seems inevitable that resolution of § 7 cases must remain a two-step process, 
and complexities are bound to arise in attempting to apply an order of divestiture to 
the assets involved. Respondents, because of their superior acquaintance with the 
status of those assets, are customarily required to draft a plan of compliance con-
taining the manner in which they propose to comply with the directive embodied 
in the order to divest. Normal self-interest will lead to a host of interpretative diffi-
culties if the plan is required only to create an "effective competitor." A less vague 
objective, while it cannot remove all possible interpretative issues, can provide a 
starting point for eventual agreement, and can minimize to some extent the initial 
impulse generated by self-interest to magnify the complexity of the practical problems 
involved. See First Security Nat'l l3ank &: Trust Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 34 (1965), 
51. Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM, L. REv, 
500, 519 (1964): "There is as yet little in the Commission's decisions that indicates 
an awareness of its special abilities to consider the interplay of remedial and substan-
tive problems." See also Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic 
Victories of Antitrust, 27 !ND. L.J. I (1951); Oppenheim, Timburg &: Van Cise, Dives-
titure as a Remedy Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119 
(1950). 
52. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
53. Professor Zimmerman raises an interesting question of the relationship of 
remedy to substantive doctrine in the context of Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 
(1960), atfd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). If the Commission cannot prohibit the 
entry of a company into a line of commerce by way of internal expansion, is it an 
economical use of resources to attempt to preserve that industry as a small-company 
industry by prohibiting entry via acquisition? See Zimmerman, supra note 51, at 520, 
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framed with reference to the substantive conclusion, the ultimate 
disposition of the divested assets might have followed a different 
course. 
The contrasting results of two instances in which the Federal 
Trade Commission elucidated upon the meaning of "restoring com-
petition" are indicative of the varying meanings it has given to that 
term. In Crown Zellerbach Corp.,54 the professed aim of the Commis-
sion's decree was to restore the acquired company to the operating 
condition and organization that "existed at or around the time of 
the acquisition.''55 In light of the demand for innovation, improve-
ment, and expansion generated , by a growing economy, such an 
entity is not likely to be as significant a competitive force in terms 
of present market potential as was the acquired company prior to 
its acquisition. This is especially true if any appreciable amount of 
time has elapsed in the interim. 
The Commission's more recent order in Fruehauf Trailer Co.,56 
on the other hand, called for a plan of divestiture that would 
recreate the acquired companies with approximately the competitive 
strength and standing they would have enjoyed at the time of di-
vestiture but for the illegal acquisition.57 In contrast to the Crown 
Zellerbach approach, such an objective involves an attempt to project 
the competitive impact of the acquired company in the market 
structure existing at the time of the merger into the market structure 
existing at the time of the decree, thereby taking into consideration 
changes within the industry during the interim. This concern with 
interim changes in the competitive structure of the relevant market 
is clearly justified, since the impact of an acquisition illegal under 
section 7 lies not only in the elimination of a competitor but also 
in the resulting disruption of competitive conditions within a given 
line of commerce. Divestiture, to be effective, must eliminate both 
of these adverse effects as far as possible. A recognition of the dual 
function served by divestiture has led to a reluctance to allow a 
decree which would allow piecemeal sale of illegally held assets. 
Such a sale neither recreates the acquired enterprise nor restores 
pre-merger competitive conditions within t.he relevant market.58 
This suggests that practicality of remedy should in certain circumstances be consid-
ered as a factor in the formulation of substantive doctrine. 
54. 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957), afj'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 
937 (1962). 
55. Id. at 807. This limited objective may have been the product of a literal 
interpretation of Commission power to bring after-acquired assets within the range 
of their order. See text accompanying notes 10-21 supra. 
56. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1f 17292 (July 19, 1965). 
57. Id. at 22410. 
58, Piecemeal sale of illegally-held assets is generally not resorted to as an alter-
native to divestiture without some compelling reason. E.g., Erie Sand & Gravel Co., 
TR.ADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1959-60) ,r 28358 (Oct. 26, 1959) ("To permit piece-
meal sale of the property could not correct the harm that has been rendered to com-
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However, the Fruehauf method of projecting the former competitive 
impact of the acquired company into the existing market structure is 
unrealistic. This "but for" analysis entails an assessment based upon 
a projection of factors that are so unpredictable as to render the 
conclusion largely a matter of conjecture. For example, the acquired 
company's performance in the interim would be largely dependent 
upon the unmeasurable qualities of human ability and performance 
under varying conditions. It is hard to see how the Commission 
could adapt such an objective to such a case as Ekco Products Co.,lio 
where the hearing examiner noted that one of the acquired com-
panies had poor future prospects at the time of the merger, although 
it could not be categorized as a failing company.00 
The Fruehauf objective appears to be hampered by the same 
overemphasis that rendered the Crown Zellerbach objective inef-
fective. Each stresses re-creation of the acquired enterprise, rather 
than focusing upon restructuring the former competitive situation 
within the present relevant market. It would be conceptually helpful 
if divestiture were regarded not as re-creating the acquired company, 
but as laying the foundation for the creation of a new company capa-
ble of eliminating the effects of an unlawful acquisition.01 To do so, 
the new firm must have a competitive impact-best defined simply 
as "share of the relevant market"-approximately equal to that which 
the acquired company had prior to the merger. This approach would 
focus attention upon projecting the competitive picture at the time 
of merger into the competitive situation at the date of the decree, 
and would thus avoid the conjecture invplved in attempting to 
predict how the acquired company itself would have fared in the 
interim. Futhermore, projecting the competitive structure would 
have the advantage of talcing into consideration the changes within 
the line of commerce in the intervening time span. The desired 
market potential of the divested enterprise could be adjusted when 
petition."); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th 
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962). At least one court, however, included a 
provision which allowed piecemeal sale if sale of the entire company could not be 
othenvise effectuated within a twelve-month period. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 
1963 Trade Cas. 11 70738 (S.D. Ohio). 
59. Ekco Products Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 1116879 (April 21, 
1964). 
60. Id. at 21908. 
61. Several recent decrees appear to support this concept. In United States v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., BNA .ANTITRUST&: TRADE REG. REP. 207, A-11 (D. Utah June 
29, 1965), the Federal District Court in Utah approved a consent decree that called 
for the creation of Northwest Pipeline Company to take over the assets acquired 
from the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. in 1957. The new company will have assets 
of $243 million and will operate 1500 miles of pipeline. In National Sugar Ref. 
Co.,TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 11 15708 (Feb. 1, 1962) the sale was 
to be made to Godchaux Sugar Ref. Co., a corporation formed expressly to 
acquire these assets. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 
333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
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there have been new entries into the market, as well as when the 
market shares have fluctuated among the companies previously en-
gaged in the industry, thereby enabling the desired "share of the 
market" to represent a figure which would give the divested company 
an overall competitive impact proportionate to that of the acquired 
enterprise at the time of the merger. 
B. Utilization of the Standard 
So defined, the objective can become the focal point from which 
crucial questions concerning the scope of divestiture can be resolved. 
For instance, whether assets added after the acquisition are to be 
divested need not be decided as an isolated abstraction of proprietary 
right nor strictly as a statutory issue of remedial power. Rather, the 
analysis would initially turn to whether such assets were deemed 
requisite to the divested company's capacity to achieve the desired 
market potential. So viewed, fluctuations in total sales and productive 
capacity within the relevant line of commerce in the interim between 
merger and divestiture would affect the quantum of assets to be 
divested. If production and sales in the industry had risen in the 
interim, it would normally take additional assets for the divested 
company to capture an equal market share of the increased volume; 
similarly, fewer assets would have to be divested if sales and produc-
tion had declined. The offending company would not retain unjusti-
fied benefits as a result of an unlawful merger. If the acquisition 
enabled it to capture a share of the total market in excess of the 
combined shares held by the acquiring and acquired concerns prior 
to the merger, the prospective market share necessary to give the 
divested company a competitive impact comparable to its pre-merger 
position would also increase, thereby requiring divestiture of addi-
tional assets to achieve this potential. 
Where a company has acquired an integrated organization in-
volved in several lines of commerce, but the acquisition has been 
found to have violated section 7 in only a single _line, a method of 
analysis which views the divested enterprise as a "new entity"62 would 
result in a more practical solution than do present methods. In that 
instance, the "but for" analysis would seem to require divestiture of 
assets involved in non-offending lines of commerce as a matter of 
course, because it is likely that the acquired company depended on 
its diversity to facilitate maintenance of its market share in the 
relevant line of commerce. Once the objective is defined as restora-
tion of competitive impact in the offending line of commerce by 
62. It is regrettable that simplistic labels must be affixed to what is essentially a 
rule of thumb. To serve convenience, however, the analysis which first focuses on the 
creation of a new entity as opposed to one which emphasizes the reincarnation of a 
dead enterprise will be referred to as the "new entity" approach. 
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creating a new entity, however, such a result does not necessarily 
follow. If the offending company submits a plan of divestiture that 
demonstrates that the desired market share can be attained by a new 
enterprise engaged in only the line of commerce in which the vio-
lation occurred, the offending company should be able to retain 
assets utilized in other lines of commerce. The public interest is 
fully protected by restoration of competitive conditions within the 
line of commerce relevant to the section 7 offense. Similarly, if it 
appears that diversification of the new entity is a prerequisite to its 
capture and maintenance of the desired market share, an order 
divesting assets used in other lines of commerce is justified. In either 
evept, the issue is resolved with a specific objective in mind rather 
than by abstractions or statutory interpretation devoid of practical 
considerations. 
There is of course no guarantee that a divested company will be 
able to realize the desired competitive potential, even with adequate 
capitalization. The chances of failure, however, can be minimized 
by including in the order provisions which recognize that realization 
of market potential· demands the possession of data concerning the 
manufacture and distribution of the product, personnel with the 
ability to utilize such knowledge, and a reasonable probability of 
locating sources of raw materials and markets for the product.08 
Various consent decrees have recognized these problems. Both the 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company04 and the Hooker 
63. Data relating to the manufacture and distribution of the product, as well as 
the technical capacity to utilize such information productively, are usually embraced 
within the term "know-how." In Ekco Products Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer 
Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16879 (S.D. Fla. April 21, 1964), the Commission, in remanding the 
case to the hearing examiner, commented that a provision requiring the provision of 
technical assistance to the divested company might be considered in his formulation of 
an effective order. The examiner's final order, however, omitted mention of any such 
device. 
Only occasionally has the purchaser been provided with technical assistance, Sec 
Minnesota Mining 8e Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) ,r 15360 
(Aug. 25, 1961); Hooker Chem. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 
,r 15369 (Aug. 31, 1961). Furthermore, the purchaser has only infrequently been given 
access to the records of the acquiring company as a means of acquiring information 
that would facilitate its capture of a desired market share. In United States v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. ,r 65955 (S.D. Fla.) (Part V. of Decree), it 
was provided that "defendant Anheuser shall furnish the prospective purchasers of 
the Miami Brewery of American [the divested company] information regarding tl1c 
Miami Brewery of American, and to permit them to have such access to, and to make 
such inspection of, the Miami Brewery of American's plant and records as arc rea-
sonably necessary." Although the needs of a purchaser may vary from case to case, 
it is surprising that this type of provision is not included more often. 
64. Minnesota Mining 8e Mfg. Co., supra note 63, resulted in an order stipulating 
that for a period of five years following divestiture the company must make available 
to the purchaser all of its electrical insulation products at the same prices and on the 
same terms offered other electrical insulation distributors. Sec also Leslie Salt Co., 
TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) ,r 15595 (Dec, 8, 1961). 
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Chemical Corporation65 were ordered to make certain products 
essential to the manufacturing process of the acquired company 
available to the purchaser at a fair price for a specified time follow-
ing the order to divest. Hooker was also ordered to provide pur-
chasers with both customer lists and engineering assistance, 66 and 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing was also ordered to transfer 
certain sales employees to the purchaser. 67 In another case, Hertz 
was required to aid the buyer in selecting appropriate locations to 
facilitate rapid re-establishment of brand-name identity. 68 
If the objective of divestiture is framed in terms of market 
potential, considerable flexibility is achieved in the attempt to create 
an acceptable enterprise at the least possible cost to the parties in-
volved. It allows a court or the Commission to consider qualitative 
as well as quantitative factors in determining what types of assets 
should be divested. For example, a need to reduce the cost of 
divestiture to the offending company can be satisfied by reducing 
the quantity of assets includable in the decree while increasing the 
quality of the assets to be divested. A more productive machine, 
better qualified personnel, or a better location may result in the 
successful capture·of the desired market share at a lower cost to all 
parties. Although details of compliance with the decree would of 
necessity remain largely a product of negotiation, this approach 
would direct the attention of the parties to the specific goal to be 
attained, and can thus provide a focal point for the exercise of 
imagination in accomplishing the optimum result at the least 
possible cost. 
III. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DIVESTITURE REMEDY 
Identification of the objective to be achieved by divestiture 
must be undertaken in the light of the practical problems that in-
evitably confront courts and the Commission in an attempt to re-
structure competition in the relevant line of commerce. 69 The dollar 
cost to the respondent of reshuffling personnel, restoring assets that 
65. Hooker Chem. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer .Binder, 1961-63) 11 15369 
(Aug. 31, 1961). · 
66. Ibid. Hooker was ordered to provide the purchaser with engineering' assistance 
in setting up test equipment and devising testing methods; the assistance was designed 
to assure that the chemical compounds produced by the new company would meet the 
quality specifications previously maintained by Hooker. 
67. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 
11 15360 (Aug. 25, 1961). 
68. United States v. Hertz Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69762 (S.D.N.Y.). 
69. Reliance on Rule 3.24, supra note 45, in .Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 
11 17244 (April 26, 1965), was based upon "the difficult practical problems encountered 
in attempting divestiture of dairy concerns which may · have been acquired many 
years ago." Id. at 22339. See generally Divestiture Problems in Merger Cases, BNA 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 196, B-1 (April 13, 1965). See also United States v. 
Chrysler Corp. & Mack Trucks, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71207 (D. N.J.). 
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either have simply disappeared,70 lost their separate identity through 
absorption into prior manufacturing operations, 71 or are being used 
concurrently in lines of commerce other than that in which the 
violation occurred, 72 sometimes serves as apparent justification for 
an order requiring less than complete divestiture.78 Such cost factors 
are the outer limits to the scope of an order of divestiture; to what 
extent private economic interests do and should influence the scope 
of a divestiture decree is perhaps the most perplexing problem in 
the use of divestiture. 
An order to divest inevitably affects many people who are in no 
way responsible for the violation. The Supreme Court long ago 
acknowledged the practical necessity of a 
[P]roper regard for the vast interests of private property which 
may have become vested in many persons as a result of the 
acquisition ... of stock ... or ... interests in the ... combina-
tion without any guilty knowledge or intent in any way to 
become actors or participants in the wrongs .... 74 
Although the Court did not in that case face the problem of 
divesting assets, 75 its reasoning would seem appropriate in such a 
case. Stockholders of the combined enterprise usually serve no 
management function. The diminution in the capital value of their 
investment, sometimes reflected by a more than proportionate de-
cline in the market value of their holdings,76 cannot be totally dis-
regarded unless it is believed that their rubber-stamp approval of 
the merger should render them accountable for the section 7 viola-
70. Ekco Products Co., TRADE R.Ec. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16879 (April 
21, 1964). 
71. E.g., Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE R.Ec. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) ,r 15772 (Feb. 
28, 1962). 
72. E.g., Ekco Products Co., TRADE R.Ec. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16879 
(April 21, 1964). 
73. E.g., National Tea Co., 3 TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,r 17463 (March 4, 1966). There the 
Commission found § 7 violations in twenty-four of National's twenty-six acquisitions 
between 1951 and 1958, but divestiture was not deemed appropriate. "While there 
is evidence •.• that existing competition has to some extent already been lessened 
in a number of these markets, we believe the various dynamic features of the industry 
itself-particularly the relative ease of entry into it-will in time, if no further 
acquisitions are permitted, effectively dissipate those not yet insuperable restraints. 
At least we think it appropriate, in the circumstances of this case, to give those nat• 
ural forces of competition a chance to correct the imbalances in those markets before 
turning to the more stringent remedy of divestiture." Id. at 22702. 
74. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1911). 
75. The remedy in United States v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 74, entailed 
the divesting of stock holdings acquired in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act. 
76. In United States v. Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. ,r 70160 (N.D. 
Tex.), the market price of Ling-Temco stock dropped from 38 at the time the com-
bination was approved by the stock.holders of both the defendants, to approximately 
34 after the stock.holders were informed that the Commission was considering action, 
and to 30½ after the suit was actually commenced. Id. at 78643. 
June 1966] Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets 1591 
tion. Employees of both companies, as well as potential employees 
of the entity to be created, have job security, pensions, and related 
benefits that deserve protection. Third parties who have dealt with 
the combined enterprise in reliance on its then existing capacity are 
directly involved. Potential creditors of the restored enterprise will 
depend upon its structure for the ultimate source of their security. 
In du Pont-General Motors IP1 the Court elaborated upon the 
concept of a "proper regard" for private economic interests. Since 
courts are required to decree relief adequate to redress a violation, 
private interests can affect choice only as between two €:;ffective 
alternatives. If complete divestiture is the only remedy which will 
effectively eliminate the anticompetitive effects of an illegal acquisi-
tion, economic hardship, however severe, cannot serve as a basis 
for denying the Government that relief.78 Subject to this broad 
guideline, the immediate and predictable impact of divestiture upon 
private economic interests is a discernible influence on the scope of 
the divestiture decree in the particular case. The· courts and the 
Commission have adopted many measures intended to ease the pain 
of parting to the respondent. It is frequently stipulated that the 
divestiture is contingent on the receipt of an adequate price for the 
divested company, 79 and that a security interest is to be retained by 
the respondent.80 Occasionally a tribunal has taken cognizance of 
what is probably the paramount "practical problem"-the difficulty 
in locating a buyer.81 Also, the practical difficulties involved in a 
77. 336 U.S. 316 (1961). 
78. Id. at 327. 
79. E.g., United States v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 1960 Trade 
Cas. 11 69810 (W.D. Pa.) (consent decree) (divested assets were to be sold at a 
price and upon terms which were reasonable under all the circumstances); Leslie 
Salt Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 1[ 15595 (Dec. 8, 1961) (consent 
decree) (for six months the properties were to be offered at a price that would net 
the seller not less than $600,000; if at the end of that time the sale was not made at 
that price, the properties were to be offered at a price that would net at least 
$450,000). Some decrees, however, are not quite so protective. E.g., United States v. 
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69599 (S.D. Fla.) (consent decree) ("The sale 
shall be at a price and upon terms which are acceptable to this Court, having due 
regard, among other things, for the rea.sonable market value of the Miami Brewery 
of American and the necessity of effectuating a sale.'). 
80. Consent decrees negotiated by the Justice Department typically allow the seller 
to retain a security interest in the divested properties. E.g., United States v. Hertz 
Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69762 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1956 
Trade Cas. 11 68253 (N.D. ID.); United States v. Minute Maid Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. 
11 68131 (S.D. Fla.). 
81. In Leslie Salt Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 11 15595 (Dec. 8, 
1961), the consent order provided that the respondent would be relieved of the re-
quirement of divestiture if, after a good faith effort to sell, the sale could not be made 
within five years. See also United States v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69810 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
1960 Trade Cas. 11 69599 (S.D. Fla.); United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 1958 
Trade Cas. 11 69160 (D. Utah). . . 
In .Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965), the Comilllss1on 
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particular case may exert a silent influence on whether divestiture 
is to be decreed in the first instance.82 Other private interests, such 
denied a request to modify an order to divest on the basis of possible difficulties in 
locating an acceptable purchaser. The Commission did, however, indicate that such 
problems could be raised in the event that the respondent's diligent and good faith 
effort to effectuate a sale to a satisfactory purchaser should prove unavailing. 
The difficulty in locating purchasers may at times have induced the Government 
to agree to a sale that itself constitutes a horizontal or vertical merger with a ques-
tionable impact upon competition. The divestiture eventually resulting from United 
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), was a sale of the Hazel Atlas 
glass-container producing plants to Brockway Glass Co., a competitor of Hazel Atlas, 
A similar result occurred in Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957), aff'd, 296 
F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962), where a sale of the stock 
and assets of St. Helen's Pulp &: Paper Co. to another West Coast paper producer 
was approved. 
Orders entered by the Commission and the courts usually designate certain pur-
chasers to whom the sale of the divested company is not to be made. Most often these 
are persons or companies controlled by the offending company. E.g., Pillsbury Milts, 
Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960); Diamond Crystal Salt Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer 
Binder, 1959-60) 11 28559 (Feb. 23, 1960). The order in the latter case also provided 
that certain salt producers engaged in the offending line of commerce were not to be 
considered as purchasers. Normally, however, specific purchasers are not mentioned. 
They are instead intended to be eliminated by requiring approval of the proposed 
buyer by the Commission or the court prior to confirmation of the sale. E.g., United 
States v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 1960 Trade Cas, 11 69810 (D.C. 
Pa.); United States v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69599 (S.D. Fla,). 
82. It is impossible to measure the impact of private economic interests upon 
an enforcement agency's initial decision of whether to institute a proceeding. It ap-
pears that in at least one instance the potential impact of divestiture upon the 
parties involved influenced a conclusion that § 7 had not been violated. The com-
plexities of that case, United States v. Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc,, 1961 Trade Cas, 
11 70160 (N.D. Tex.), were imposing, but illustrative of the situations often confronted 
in trying to apply § 7 to an already consummated merger. The Board of Directors 
and officers of the integrated enterprise represented a coalition of individuals drawn 
from both the acquired and acquiring companies. Organization of the new company 
resulted in six functional divisions and the creation of a subsidiary known as the 
new Chance-Vought Corporation, which employed 10,520 persons, 2,699 of whom were 
former Ling-Temco employees. Virtually all of the management, administrative, 
production, and technical functions of the two companies were integrated for utiliza-
tion of personnel, plant, equipment, and procedures; all projects and functions were 
assigned to the new corporation and its subsidiary. The production facilities of the 
Tempco Aircraft and Missiles Division of the former Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc., 
were integrated with the Astronautics Division of former Chance-Vought Corporation, 
which previously had no production facility of its own, but had a design and 
development capability. In each newly created division, as well as in the sub-
sidiary, there was a mutual exchange of proprietary information regarding technical 
projects, research and development, bidding activities, costs, and rates. Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc., had relocated its executive offices, as well as executive, accounting, and 
administrative personnel. A plant that had been jointly occupied but separately oper-
ated by the former Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc. and the now dissolved Chance-Vought 
Corporation was rearranged to combine the productive facilities in a single operation 
by integrating production lines, office space, and engineering space. Ling-Temco• 
Vought, Inc., spent $335,000 to accomplish this task. It also secured a $6f ,000,000 l~an 
on the basis of the combined assets, sales, and earning power of the two companies, 
At a time when three fourths of the new debentures had been delivered in exchange 
for the old Chance Vought Corporation stock, the Antitrust Division initiated a § 7 
proceeding seeking divestiture, The court's conclusion that there was no violation of 
§ 7 was undoubtedly viewed with relief by those responsible for the drafting of a 
plan of divestiture. 
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as the rights of employees83 and parties in a contractual relation to 
the merged entity, 84 have also been recognized in decrees. 
Ekco Products Co.85 provides a recent example of the role played 
by private interests in anti-merger litigation. Ekco had acquired the 
Mcclintock Mfg. Company and certain assets of the Blackman 
Stamping & Mfg. Company; each acquisition violated section 7 in 
the commercial meat-handling equipment industry. The Blackman 
assets had been transferred to a Canadian subsidiary of the respon-
dent and, after being used for a short time, were scrapped. The 
plant in which McClintock's manufacturing facilities had been 
located at the time of the acquisition had since been sublet to third 
parties; the operations were then carried out in a portion of one 
of Ekco's plants. The Commission asserted" its power to cure the ill 
effects of the acquisition by ordering the respondent to restore 
assets that had disappeared, even if that disappearance were a result 
of bona fide business conduct, but also acknowledged the practical 
financial problems which such an order would cause for the respon-
dent. The final order made no reference to the Blackman assets 
and excluded the McClintock assets to the extent that they were 
used in, but not peculiar to, the manufacture or distribution of 
commercial meat handling equipment. There was some indication 
that the Blackman assets were not ordered restored because the crea-
tion of a company in this single line of commerce86 would be a 
hazard to the prospective investors, employees, and creditors of an 
enterprise with such limited chances of success. 87 In such a case the 
83. In United States v. Hertz Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 1J 69762 (S.D.N.Y.), a consent 
decree required Hertz to release employees of the acquired concern at the time of 
acquisition from employment contracts and covenants not to compete, if the employee 
so desired. 
84. In High Voltage Eng'r Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 
1J 16361 (March 26, 1963), the decree stipulated that for one year H.V.E.C. could effec-
tuate divestiture upon the condition that the buyer complete all H.V.E.C.'s existing 
contracts and accept responsibility for warranties and servicing contracted by H.V.E.C. 
prior to divestiture. If theJ buyer would not accept this, it was required to sell to 
H.V.E.C. parts and supplies at reasonable prices to enable H.V.E.C. to meet these 
obligations. In Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,i 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965), the 
respondent contended that divestiture of certain assets located in Hawaii would in-
filct a hardship upon it and would not be in the public interest because the Hawaii 
operations were part of respondent's commitment to the Department of Defense to 
furnish dairy products to American armed forces in the Far East. The FTC did not 
feel that divestiture would interfere with these interests, since Beatrice had not con-
tended that its military commitments could not be fulfilled if divestiture were ordered. 
85. TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 1J 16879 (April 21, 1964). 
86. Whereta company has acquired assets used by the seller in only a single line 
of commerce,' divestiture of such a limited product line may pose a financial hazard 
to the divested enterprise. In such a case, divestiture may not be required at all. 
E.g., Ekco Products Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 1J 16879 (April 
21, 1964). . 
87. Ibid. In choosing to use Rule 3.24, discussed supra note 45, the Commission 
noted the possibility that "the cost of establishing a completely new company as a 
viable competitor in such a small industry as commercial meat-handling equipment 
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public interest must yield to the private interests involved. There 
was no similar indication, however, of the justification for limiting 
the scope of divestiture with regard to the McClintock assets. Un-
doubtedly, the respondent gained this concession through private 
informal negotiations, the more typical manner in which private 
interests achieve recognition.88 As a result, the impact of private 
economic interests is haphazard and usually finds no reflection in 
published opinions, whether the case is litigated or terminated by a 
consent order. This is an unfortunate method of analysis in view of 
the usual inadequacy of partial divestiture, as contrasted with com-
plete divestiture, in restoring the desired competitive state within 
an industry. 
A hearing examiner once held that divestiture was mandatory 
upon a finding that section 7 had been violated. 89 Such a holding, 
which has since been retracted,90 could have been rendered impotent 
merely by negotiating a consent decree or by dropping the issue at 
a point when it appeared that divestiture would be impracticable, 
as was done in Ekco. Nevertheless, that holding emphasized that 
every acquisition which violates section 7 results in the disruption 
of competitive conditions within an industry by the elimination of 
a competitor. As indicated by the preceding discussion, the Com-
mission and the courts should ascertain the market share which must 
be attained by the divested company if the pre-merger competitive 
situation is to be affected as little as possible by the attempted 
merger. When the divested company is deliberately given assets 
that are quantitatively or qualitatively inadequate to meet the ob-
jective of full divestiture, the public interest in the restoration of 
competition usually remains unfulfilled. However, economic hard-
ship, typically proportionate to the length of time between merger 
· and decree, often forces a modification of the objective. If partial 
divestiture is to be decreed because of such factors, 91 it should be 
might be undue, and the prospects for the survival of such a company might be re• 
mote." Id. at 21909. " 
88. For example, the original order in Fruehauf Trailer Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 
11 17292 CTuly 19, 1965), required divestiture of two companies. This order was later 
modified without explanation, and only a single company was ordered divested. 3 
TRADE REG. REP. 11 17446 (Feb. 11, 1966). See also Brillo Mfg. Co,, TRADE REG, REP, 
(Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 11 16746 Gan, 17, 1964); Diamond Crystal Salt Co., TRADE 
REG, REP. (Transfer Binder, 1959-60) 11 28559 (Feb, 23, 1960) (consent order requiring 
divestiture of assets not mentioned in the complaint). 
89. Warner Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 11 15950 crune 13, 
1962), complaint dismissed, id. 11 16405 (May 15, 1963). 
90. For example, in Ekco Prod1;1cts Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 
11 16879, at 21909 (April 21, 1964), the Commission stated that "since divestiture may 
not, in the particular circumstances of this case, be an appropriate remedy, it is par• 
ticularly important that the parties give consideration to other remedies • • • ." 
91. Partial divestiture is not always defined with reference to the desired objective 
of the decree. In du Pont-General Motors II, 366 U.S. 316 (1961), partial divestiture 
described the degree of stock ownership to be divested, "Partial" divestiture of asset 
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rationalized by the court or the Commission92 and a more limited 
market objective should be identified as a substitute.93 This method 
of analysis does not deny that factors unrelated to the substantive 
violation limit both the existence and scope of divestiture; rather, 
it compels consideration and clarification of the competing forces. 
It would be helpful to all involved if such considerations were also 
spelled out in consent decrees. Eventually, increased understanding 
of the role of economic interests could contribute to a more uniform 
antitrust policy, as well as providing an element of foresight in the 
initial decision of whether to pursue a given case by issuing a 
complaint. 
It is impossible to generalize concerning the proper recognition 
to be given private economic interests, beyond an acknowledgement 
of their demonstrated role. Certain observations, however, can be 
made. A compromise solution should be reached only after a con-
sideration of all private interests. If, for example, particular assets 
are excluded from the order to ease the cost to a respondent, it 
should be recognized that the interests of potential employees, 
creditors, and investors in the divested concern may be infringed.94 
Not only may the proposed package of assets prove unsalable;95 
acquisitions has usually been considered to be the divestment of less than all the 
assets acquired by the offending company. Divestiture Problems in Merger Cases, 
13.N.A. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 196, 13-1 (April 13, 1965). If "partial" divestiture. 
is defined as the divestment of assets sufficient only to enable the divested company 
to attain a competitive position of less stature than that of the acquired company 
prior to the merger, this is not necessarily true. See text accompanying notes 53-54 
supra. 
92. One of the few cases in which a remedy of less than complete divestiture was 
explicitly discussed and justified was United States v. Continental Can Co., 1964 Trade 
Cas. 11 71264 (S.D.N.Y.). The court allowed Continental to retain two of the eleven 
plants originally divested, because of the potentially disastrous results of the sale of 
these plants upon the job security and related benefits of employees in the already 
distressed economic area. 
93. See, e.g., United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 
11 69160 (D. Utah), in which the consent decree provided that if the seller was 
unable to divest the illegally held assets, a provision would be substituted, setting a 
maximum percentage of the relevant market that could be captured by the offending 
company. Thirty-nine per cent of the beer consumed in Utah was the maximum 
amount that could be sold by the respondent, its affiliates, and its subsidiaries. See 
also Martin-Marietta Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 11 16335 
(March 12, 1963); Simpson Timber Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1961-63) 
11 15664 Gan. 4, 1962). The ancillary measures discussed in note 26 supra, most no-
tably the ban on future acquisitions in the relevant line of commerce, may well be the 
maximum remedy possible if the practical difficulties of unravelling a complex cor-
porate structure prove insuperable. 
94. Allied Stores Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 17342 (Oct. 13, 1965), is an interest-
ing example of the potential impact of divestiture upon innocent third parties. The 
order required divestiture of a property located in, and apparently the center of, a 
large shopping center. "[D]ivestiture shall duly take into account the interest of North 
Star Mall Inc., and of the other merchants in the • • • Center in the maintenance 
of the drawing power of the store and the effective operation of the shopping center 
as an integrated merchandising unit." Id. at 22500. 
95. See note 69 supra. It should be recognized that provisions in the decree meant 
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purchase of those assets may be financially disastrous to the pur-
chaser. Likewise, the economic impact of a compromise upon other 
competitors in the industry should be balanced against the cost of 
restoration to the acquiring company. An industry-wide attack upon 
growth through acquisition, as has recently occurred in the cement00 
and dairy97 industries, makes such an overall comparison especially 
imperative. For example, Foremost Dairies was ordered to divest a 
fluid milk processing plant located in Abilene, Texas, because of 
the advantage its acquisition gave to the integrated operation over 
the smaller local dairies which had to ship their milk into Abilene 
from outlying areas.98 The Borden Company, also in Abilene via 
acquisition, was the only competing dairy in a similarly advanta-
geous position. The Commission proceeded against Borden sepa-
rately, alleging that the acquisition of the Abilene plant was a 
violation of section 7. The consent decree that terminated the case 
did not require divestiture of that facility.00 Thus, instead of two 
large dairies with cost advantages over local producers, Abilene was 
left ·with only one. This result not only raises questions concerning 
the propriety of individual adjudicative proceedings as a means of 
implementing a public interest with industry-wide significance,100 
but also emphasizes the need to consider all private interests in-
volved before compromising the individual case.101 
to ensure that the restored company would be able to capture the desired market 
share-know-how, supply, and market provisions, supra note 54-also create a more 
salable entity, thereby decreasing the possibility that the public interest will be de• 
feated because of the offending company's inability to sell the assets. 
96. See Permanente Cement Co. &: Glacier Sand &: Gravel Co., TMDE REG, REP. 
{Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16885 (April 24, 1964), for a discussion of the situation 
in the cement industry. 
97. Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TMDE REG. REP. ,I 17398 (Dec. 10, 1965); Borden Co., 
TRADE REG. REP. {Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16869 (April 15, 1964); Foremost Dairies, 
Inc., TMDE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) 11 16435 (May 23, 1963); National 
Dairy Prods. Corp., TMDE REG. REP. {Transfer Binder, 1961-63) ,r 16282 Oan. 30, 
1963). 
98. Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 97. 
99. Borden Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,J 16869 (April 15, 1964), 
100. In Permanente Cement Co. &: Glacier Sand &: Gravel Co., TMDE REG. REP, 
(Transfer :Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16885, at 21924 (April 24, 1964), the Commission stated 
that "in recognition that the problem of vertical integration in the cement industry 
through merger is of growing importance and urgency and has apparently assumed 
industry-wide dimensions," it would institute a Trade Regulation Rule proceeding 
under § 1.63 of the Commission's Procedures and Rules of Practice (effective August 1, 
1963). This rule is based on a recognition that "where a problem involves an entire 
industry made up of a large number of firms, it may be uneconomical, inefficient, and 
inequitable to proceed exclusively on the basis of individual adjudicative proceedings. 
Industry-wide problems require, so far as is practicable, industry-wide solutions ••• , 
Such a proceeding affords a better forum than do adjudicative proceedings against 
individual companies for organizing and appraising the general economic facts involv• 
ing industry and market structure that are so important under Section 7." Ibid. Sec 
also the dissent by Commissioner Elman in National Tea Co., 3 TMDE REG. REP, 
,r 17463, at 22702 (March 4, 1966). 
101. The order originally entered in Foremost Dairies, Inc., TMDE REG, REP, 
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The justifiable cost impact of divestiture upon an offending com-
pany sometimes involves a delicate weighing of equities, some of 
seemingly dubious relevance. It has been intimated, for example, 
that a company which effectuates a merger after the Justice Depart-
ment refuses to approve it, or after the company successfully resists 
a temporary injunction, will be given less favorable treatment than 
a more acquiescent respondent.102 The propriety of this procedure 
is subject to question, especially with reference to the latter situation. 
It is difficult to perceive the relevance of the ·respondent's initial 
decision as to the legality of its acquisition to the determination of 
either pie existence of the violation or the proper remedy. On the 
other hand, a long interval between purchase and prosecution would 
appear to be a relevant factor in defining the scope of the divestiture. 
Section 7 has no statute of limitations, but if the economic hardship 
visited upon a respondent is traceable to a delay in initiating pro-
ceedings, equitable considerations dictate accommodation of private 
interests to a somewhat greater extent by more readily resorting to 
alternatives to total divestiture.103 Again, it would be helpful if such 
considerations were enumerated in both litigated orders and con-
sent decrees. 
IV. CONCLUSION . 
The time interval between a merger of two or more corporate 
entities and the entering of an order to divest the acquired concern 
provides both the source an.d the aggravation of the practical prob-
lems which inhibit effective enforcement of section 7. A mandatory 
pre-merger approval procedure would eliminate these problems; how-
ever,. the impracticability of this solution has prevented its adoption. 
A milder alternative is a preliminary injunctio,n104 which, if granted, 
either blocks the merger pending disposition on the merits or allows 
it to be consummated on the co~dition that the acquired company 
be maintained as a separate business unit.105 In either form, the 
(Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 16435 (May 23, 1963), did not contain a ban on future 
acquisitions as did all other orders entered in suits brought against companies in that 
industry. However, the order in Foremost was later modified to include such a ban. 
TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,r 17217 (March 5, 1965). See generally 
Industry-Wide Enforcement by the FTC, B.N.A. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 231, 
B-1 (Dec. 14, 1965). 
102. See Divestiture Problems in Merger Cases, B.N.A. ANnTRusr &: TRADE REG. 
REP. 196, B-1 (April 13, 1965). ~ 
103. Cf. ABC Vending Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, 1963-65) ,J 16880 
(April 15, 1964). 
104. Section 15 .of the Clayton Act vests the district courts with jurisdiction to 
prevent and restrain violations of the act at the suit of the Government, and provides· 
that "before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining 
order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises." 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). 
105. The first success of preliminary relief was in United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 
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granting of preliminary relief facilitates divestiture if that is ulti-
mately deemed necessary. Because of doubts concerning its ability 
to seek preliminary relief, the FTC has not utilized this remedy;100 
the result has been that the Commission has been confronted with 
the troublesome issues of asset divestiture more frequently than has 
the Department of Justice. The foregoing discussion of the practical 
problems incidental to divestiture indicates that the unavailability 
of preliminary relief has not been an insuperable obstacle to effective 
enforcement of section 7 by the Commission, although intervening 
equities of private interests have sometimes dictated less than full 
relief. 
0 
Most of the questions surrounding the nature of the basic objec-
tive of asset divestiture and the identification of the practical limita-
tions upon its use are unresolved, not because they seldom arise but 
because they are seldom discussed. This is unfortunate in view of 
the increasing use of divestiture and its importance in eliminating 
the anticompetitive effects of unlawful acquisitions. The courts and 
the Commission cannot, as a practical matter, detail the form of 
divestiture at the time the substantive doctrine to be applied in each 
case is formulated. This separation in time, however, should not 
serve as a rationalization for the present failure to confront the 
crucial issues directly and to provide needed guidance to those in-
volved in the process of divesting unlawfully acquired assets. If the 
courts and Commission would define the objective of divestiture in 
terms of the creation of a new entity with a market potential ade-
quate to restructure the competitive state of an industry in approxi-
mately its pre-merger condition, the critical issues concerning the 
qualitative and quantitative nature of the precise assets to be in-
cluded in the decree could be resolved without losing sight of the 
substantive ills that divestiture is designed to eliminate. If this rule 
of thumb is to be modified in light of the peculiar facts of an in-
dividual case, the alteration should be explained in detail, whether 
the proceeding culminates in an order or a consent decree. Such a 
method of analysis would contribute to a uniform and fair adminis-
tration of section 7, and would provide a basis for statistical study 
from which the success of the methods adopted could be measured 
1956 Trade Cas. ,I 68244 (E.D. Mo.), in which the district court declined to prohibit 
the acquisition but did grant a preliminary order imposing a number of conditions 
on the merger designed to maintain the separation and identity of the merging enter-
prises. The Justice Department makes frequent use of preliminary relief. E.g., United 
States v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., :B.N.A. ANnnUST &: TRADE REG, REP. 2!14, A-2 
Gan. 4, 1966); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., B.N.A. ANTITRUST &: TRADE REG. 
REP. 234, A-5 Gan, ~. 1966); United States v. Herff Jones Co., B.N.A. ANnmuST &: 
TRADE REG. REP. 231, A-20 (Dec. 14, 1965). 
106. The doubts concerning the Commission's ability to seek preliminary relief 
were recently resolved by the Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
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and analyzed. The varied practical problems that inevitably arise in 
anti-merger litigation would undoubtedly continue to limit the 
scope of divestiture in the individual case, but consideration and 
clarification of the roles played by the competing forces would be 
encouraged. 
William T. Kerr 
